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In instances when individual claims against a defendant are too small to be 
economically viable to pursue or when there are too many plaintiffs to be joined in one 
action despite common issues of law and fact, the solution is a class action lawsuit.  In 
Eubank v. Pella Corporation, Judge Posner described their value: “The class action is an 
ingenious procedural innovation that enables persons who have suffered a wrongful 
injury, but are too numerous for joinder of their claims alleging the same wrong committed 
by the same defendant or defendants to be feasible, to obtain relief as a group, a class 
as it is called.  The device is especially important when each claim is too small to justify 
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the expense of a separate suit, so that without a class action there would be no relief, 
however meritorious the claims.”2   
This article will compare and contrast class action lawsuits from inception to 
conclusion in Pennsylvania state and federal courts.  First, this article will provide a brief 
history of the two forms of class actions.  Then, this article will discuss class action 
litigation mechanics.  Starting with prerequisites to a class action and class membership, 
the article will also discuss commencing the action, certification orders, conducting the 





Prior to the class action, there was a practice of "group litigation" in medieval 
England from about 1200.3  These lawsuits involved groups of people either suing or 
being sued in actions at common law. The groups were typically formed from existing 
structures in society like villages, towns, parishes, and guilds. Unlike modern courts, 
medieval courts did not question the right of the named plaintiffs to sue on behalf of a 
group or the right of a few representatives to defend an entire group.4 
From approximately 1400 to 1700, group litigation gradually transitioned from 
being the norm in England to the exception.5 By 1850, Parliament had enacted several 









the impetus for most types of group litigation; it went into a steep decline and was 
essentially dead in England after 1850.7   
 
B.	Class	actions	in	the	United	States	
The first class action rule in the United States was in the Federal Equity Rules, 
specifically Equity Rule 48, promulgated in 1842: 
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without 
manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought 
before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them 
parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to 
represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the 
suit properly before it. But in such cases the decree shall be without 
prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.8 
 
This allowed for representative suits in situations where there were too many 
parties to proceed individually (which now forms the first requirement for class action 
litigation, numerosity).9  However, this rule did not allow these suits to bind similarly 
situated absent parties, which rendered the rule ineffective.10  Within ten years, the 
Supreme Court interpreted Rule 48 in such a way so that it could apply to absent parties 
under certain circumstances, but only by ignoring the plain meaning of the rule.11   
















Pennsylvania class actions were initially governed by Rule 2230 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.13  However, in 1973, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Zahn v. International Paper14, which required that each plaintiff (not just 
the named representatives) in a federal class action must meet the jurisdictional amount 
in order to sustain the suit under diversity jurisdiction.  As a result of Zahn and because 
state courts would consequently handle more class actions, Pennsylvania adopted a set 
of rules governing class actions in 1977.15  These rules are a compilation of parts of Rule 
23 governing class actions, parts of the Uniform Class Action Act, and some provisions 







Rules 23(a) and (b) govern the requirements for class certification. Rule 23(a) sets 
forth four threshold requirements for class certification, each of which must be met: (1) 
the class is so numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or 
defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class (typicality); and (4) 







(adequacy).16  Rule 23(b) governs the categories of allowed class actions.  In order to be 
certified, the action must fall into one of these categories: a risk of incompatible duties for 
the class opponent, present a risk of practical impairment on nonparties’ interests, 
constitute a class seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, or predominantly cover common 
legal or factual questions between class members.17   
	
2.	Class	Actions	in	Pennsylvania	State	Court	
Pennsylvania Rules 1702(1), (2), and (3) mirror Rules 23(a)(1), (2), and (3) on 
numerosity, commonality, and typicality. Pennsylvania Rule 1702(4) on adequacy 
incorporates criteria set forth in a separate rule, Pennsylvania Rule 1709, which sets forth 
a standard for adequacy of representation that is substantively similar to Rule 23(a)(4).  
In Pennsylvania, as in federal practice, there are four prerequisites for a class 
action; when these are met, one or more members of the class may bring the action as 
representatives of the class. The prerequsites in Pennsylvania state court mirror those of 
federal court.  There is an additional requirement in Pennsylvania state court not found in 
the federal courts: the class action must provide for a fair and efficient method of 
adjudication of the suit as provided for under Rule 1708.18 For a class action to be 
considered for certification, all of these prerequisites must be met.  As in federal court, 




18 Pa. R.C.P. 1702(1)–(5); See Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 729 A.2d 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (thorough discussion 
of class action prerequisites and dismissal of one class representative for being a former employee of law firm 
representing the class); Hayes v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Basile v. H & R Block, 
Inc., 52 A.3d 1202 (Pa. 2012)(Holding that class action lawsuit against a tax preparation company was properly 
decertified because a necessary element of the plaintiffs’ proof - the presence of a confidential relationship - was not 
amenable to class treatment). 
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the burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites.19 The class proponent must 
establish the underlying facts from which the court can conclude that the class certification 
requirements and criteria are met.20  
Pennsylvania courts will also consider several additional factors in determining 
whether the prerequisites are satisfied. Pennsylvania Rule 1708 lists multiple criteria21 to 
determine whether a class action is a fair and efficient method of adjudication based upon 
the type of recovery contemplated. Pennsylvania Rule 1709 lists three criteria22 for 
                                                            
19 Haft v. United States Steel Corp., 451 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. Ct.1982). For denial of class action, see Cribb v. United 
Health Clubs, Inc., 485 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 



































determining whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately represent the 
class.   
There is no Pennsylvania equivalent of Rule 23(b).  Instead, the court has 
discretion to allow or disallow the class based on whether the suit represents a fair and 
efficient method of adjudication.23  There is no need to fit into a particular type of class 
action in Pennsylvania state court.24 
Class action prerequisites are substantially similar in Pennsylvania state and 
federal courts, but there are some subtle differences discussed in the following sections. 
B.	Prerequisite:	Numerosity	
1.	Federal	Class	Actions	
The numerosity requirement of Rule 23 does not focus exclusively on the number 
of members of the putative class but rather on the impracticality of individual joinder.25  
The courts do not apply a strict numerical test for determining impracticality of joinder.  
Generally, classes of less than 20 are not considered sufficiently numerous and classes 
of 40 or more meet the numerosity requirement.26  Rather than relying only on numbers, 




25 See, e.g., Anderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1998); 1 William Rubenstein, Alba 
Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:3 (4th ed. and Supp. 2010). See In re 
Modalifinil Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d 238, 248 (3d. Cir. 2016) (holding that inquiry into impracticability should be 
particularly rigorous when the putative class consists of fewer than 40 members). 
26 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the NW. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) (suggesting 15 is too few); Hayes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Incorporated, 725 F.3d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 2013) (presuming numerosity at 40); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of 
Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (same). Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 245 F.R.D. 478 (D. Colo. 
2007) (rejecting class of 115); Peoples v. Sebring Capital Corp., 209 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (certifying a class of 
eleven individuals); Grant v. Sullivan, 131 F.R.D. 436 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that in some cases, particularly where 
declaratory and injunctive relief is sought classes as small as fourteen may be certified); Hernandez v. Alexander, 
152 F.R.D. 192 (D. Nev. 1993) (indicating that a class of fifty-two might meet numerosity requirements but declined to 
certify because of failure to show “impracticability” of individual joinder). 
27 Gen. Tel. Co. of the NW. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980); Rannis v. Recchia, 380 F. App'x 646, 651 (9th Cir. 
2010); Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th 
Cir. 1996); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1993);  
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Although a large number of class members may suffice to prove numerosity, other 
factors are considered in determining whether joinder is impracticable.28  These factors 
include the ease of identifying and finding individual class members, geographical 
separation, the composition of the class, size of individual claims, individual ability and 
motivation to bring separate actions, and the nature of the claims raised and relief 
sought.29 The courts will not resort to speculation.30  If the size and impracticality of joinder 
appear to be a problem in a case, adjusting the class definition may resolve the issue.   
Examples of this may include eliminating subclasses (each subclass must independently 
meet the numerosity requirements) or including persons who will be affected in the 
future.31   
2.	Class	Actions	in	Pennsylvania	State	Court	
The numerosity requirement under the Pennsylvania rules mirrors the Federal 
rules.  A defendant cannot defeat the numerosity requirement by arguing that the 
plaintiff’s inability to identify the total number of class members renders the class definition 
overbroad.32  However, numerosity was held not to be established in Weismer v. Beech-
                                                            
28 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1762, at 176 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2010); 
29 See, e.g., In re Modalifinil Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d at 252-53 (citing 5 Moore's Federal Practice § 23.22; 5 
Newberg on Class Actions § 3.12).  See Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry, 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983); Sullivan 
v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 268   F.R.D. 356, 362 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Neese v. Johanns, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25344, at *15, 
2006 WL 1169800, at *5 (W.D. Va. May 2, 2006); Talbott v. GC Servs., Ltd. Pshp., 191 F.R.D. 99 (W.D. Va. 2000); 
McGlothlin v. Connors, 142 F.R.D. 626, 632 (W.D. Va. 1992).  
30 Marcus v. BMW of North Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267-
68 (11th Cir. 2009); Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 966 (6th Cir. 2005). 
31 See e.g., Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 868 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000). Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 
1118 (9th Cir. 2010)(Holding that such inclusion of future victims does not render the class definition too vague for 
certification); Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of Antioch, No. 
90, 2010 WL 3632197, at *6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97829, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010). 
32 Keppley v. School District of Twin Valley, 866 A.2d 1165 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (proponent of class need not 
plead or prove actual number of class members, so long as she can define class with some precision and provide 
sufficient indicia that more members exist than it would be practicable to join); Baldassari v. Suburban Cable TV Co. 
Inc., 808 A.2d 184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (reversing trial court denial of certification of class of cable television 
subscribers who had been assessed late fees, and pointing out that defendant’s administrative difficulties in 
calculating number of subscribers did not defeat numerosity). 
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Nut Nutrition Corporation33 because of an overly broad definition of class.  So, an overly 
broad definition of class can be a valid defense against certification, but is not a perfect 




Plaintiffs’ claims generally must share a common question of law or fact.34  Rule 
23 does not require that all questions of law or all questions of fact be common to all class 
members.35  In fact, only one question of law or fact must be common to the proposed 
class.36  Some factual differences among class members do not defeat commonality.37 
Class actions that seek class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief "by their very nature 
present common questions of law and fact."38   
Allegations may be made that the common question of law or fact is tied to 
systemic violations of law.39 However, in Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, the plaintiff class 
claimed that the government and its contractor terminated the benefits of disabled city 
workers without providing them an opportunity to challenge the termination before it 
occurred. The court decertified the class after receiving summary judgment filings when 
it concluded the procedural due process violations were the result of different practices 
                                                            
33 615 A.2d 428, 430-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (overly broad definition of class led to failure to satisfy numerosity; 
while that defect could have been corrected, court also held there was no predominance of common issues). 
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2556; Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994). 
35 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2556; Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 536 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 1050 (2009); Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
36 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.  See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481, 497 (7th Cir. 
2012); D.G. ex rel. Stricklin v. DeVaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010); In Re Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 75 F.3d at 
1080; Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56; Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 246 F.R.D. 326, 337 (D.D.C. 2007). 
37 D.G., 594 F.3d at 1195; Lightfoot, 246 F.R.D. at 337; Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 32 (D.D.C. 
2003).  
38 Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. WMATA, 239 F.R.D. 9, 26 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Wright, et al., 
supra note 34, § 1763.). 
39 D.G., 594 F.3d at 1195; Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, No. 01-01484 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2011).  
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which did not uniformly pervade the entire class. The court held that plaintiffs were 
required to specifically identify a particular policy or custom that both violates due process 
and is common to the entire class.40  This meant that the court found a lack of 
commonality between plaintiffs when resolving the summary judgment motion. 
The Supreme Court addressed a commonality issue in the Title VII context in Wal-
Mart Stores v. Dukes.41   In Wal-Mart Stores, the plaintiffs contended that local managers 
had substantial discretion over pay and promotion that had a disparate impact on women. 
This discretion was exercised within a corporate culture of discrimination that Wal-Mart 
management knew about but did nothing to stop.  This common discriminatory practice 
adversely affected all female employees. The Court took issue with defining commonality 
at a high level of generality: 
The mere claim by employees of the same company that they have 
suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives 
no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at once. 
Their claims must depend upon a common contention - for example, the 
assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That 
common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable 
of class wide resolution - which means that determination of its truth or 
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the 
claims in one stroke.42 
 
The Court held that the plaintiffs had established the existence of a corporate 
policy of delegating to local managers decision-making authority over pay and 
promotions.  But, the court also concluded that the delegation did not result in 
commonality.  What was required was a showing that local managers exercised this 
discretion in a common way.  National and regional disparities in pay and promotion 
                                                            
40 Lightfoot, No. 01-01484. 
41  Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
42 Id. at 2551. 
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between men and women fell short of that because they failed to show the store-by-store 
differences.  In the end, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate commonality because they 
could not point to a specific employment practice that directly affected all women at Wal-
Mart.43   
Commonality may be demonstrated by expert opinion and statistical 
evidence.  However, Wal-Mart Stores may have made doing that more difficult. The Court 
demanded "significant proof" of a policy of discrimination and was quite critical of the 
plaintiffs’ expert who attempted to supply such proof, while expressing a view that such 
experts must meet the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow.44  Affidavits from class 
members containing anecdotal evidence of harm may also be used to support 
commonality.45  However, the Wal-Mart Court found 120 affidavits insufficient because 
they represented a very small percentage of class members and only a small portion of 
the national coverage of Wal-Mart stores.46  If the proposed class definition fails to 









46 Id. at 2556 (Court holds that anecdotes presented cover only 6 states in which Wal-Mart is located with as few as 
one or two cases in a given state). 
47 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4); See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010); Gunnells v. 
Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 
147, 167 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 951 (2002). 
48 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5). See e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir. 2009); 
McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 461, 473–74 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
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Commonality under the Pennsylvania rules mirrors the Federal rules.  
Commonality means common characteristics of the case at hand. Class certification was 
granted in Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,49 where the claims centered on a 
uniformly defective braking system in one model yielding common questions of fact. 
However, in Zwiercan v. General Motors Corp.,50 the court found predominance of 
common questions lacking where the allegedly unsafe seat design was included in fifty-
five automobile models from nine model years and there was no showing that the same 
seats were in all models. 
 The need for individualized inquiry into the factual basis of plaintiff’s claims typically 
results in a lack of commonality and no class action being certified.  Basile v. H&R Block, 
Inc. is illustrative on this point.  In 1999, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the 
trial court for abuse of discretion in refusing to certify Basile’s claims under Pennsylvania’s 
consumer protection law for lack of commonality.51 The appellate court held that because 
H&R Block was a fiduciary of the plaintiffs, reliance by the class plaintiffs was implicit and 
established by operation of law, and therefore did not need to be proven on an individual 
basis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the decision on other grounds52 and on 
remand, the Superior Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish the 
elements of a confidential relationship. If that relationship were successfully demonstrated 
upon remand to the trial court, then reliance, inherent in a finding of fiduciary duty, would 
be presumed for purposes of the claims under the Pennsylvania consumer protection 
                                                            
49 68 Pa. D & C 4th 270 (C.P. Phila. 2004), aff’d, No. 3048 EDA 2005 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2007), aff’d, 34 A.3d 1 
(Pa. 2011), 
50 68 Pa. D. & C. 4th 449 (C.P. Phila. 2004). 
51 729 A.2d 574 (Pa. Super Ct. 1999). 
52 761 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 2000), 
14 
 
law.53  Upon remand, the trial court held that proof of a confidential relationship in those 
circumstances required individualized inquiry and decertified the class.54  Despite 
reversal by the Superior Court, the Supreme Court ultimately held that proof of a 
confidential relationship required individualized inquiry and that the trial court’s 






While commonality and typicality "tend to merge,"56 the commonality requirement 
focuses on the common thread among all class members, and the typicality requirement 
focuses on the named representatives. In General Telephone Company of the Southwest 
v. Falcon, the Supreme Court held that the class representative had to “possess the same 
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”57 The typicality requirement 
centers on “whether the class representative’s claims have the same essential 
                                                            
53 Basile v. H&R Block, Inc., 777 A.2d 95, 107-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), appeal denied, 806 A.2d 857 (Pa. 2002). 
54 66 Pa. D & C 4th 57 (C.P. Phila. 2004). 
55 Basile v. H&R Block, Inc., 52 A.3d 1202 (Pa. 2012).  See also See Clark v. Pfizer Inc., 990 A.2d 17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2010) (commonality not satisfied due to individual issues of reliance and/or causation); Wurtzel v. Park Towne Place 
Associates Limited Partnership, 2002 WL 31487894 (C.P. Phila. Nov. 5, 2002) (fraud claim certified for class action 
where reliance could be presumed from fiduciary relationship); Foultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 2002 WL 452115, 
*16 (C.P. Phila. March 13, 2002) (certified insurance bad faith claim where insurer’s alleged bad faith predicated on 
common course of conduct); Cwietniewicz v. Aetna U.S. Health Care, Inc., June Term 1998, No. 423 (C.P. Phila. 
Nov. 7, 2001) (class certified for claims of fraud, inter alia, where reliance can be presumed from common material 
omission); Parsky v. First Union Corporation, 51 Pa. D & C. 4th 468 (C.P. Phila. 2001) (certified class claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty; minor differences in underlying trust documents do not prevent satisfaction of commonality 
requirement). 




characteristics as those of the putative class. If the claims arise from a similar course of 
conduct and share the same legal theory, factual differences will not defeat typicality.”58 
Put another way, typicality can be determined by whether there is a sufficient 
nexus between the claims of the named representatives and those of the class.59  As with 
commonality, factual differences do not defeat typicality if the course of conduct and the 
claims are based on the same legal theory.60 
However, typicality is not present when a class representative's claim may be 
challenged by a unique defense and that defense may preoccupy the class 
representative, potentially placing her interests ahead of those of the class.61  In addition, 
typicality generally requires at least one named plaintiff to have claims against each 
defendant.62  Otherwise there would be no standing against defendants with no claims 
against them.63  There are two exceptions to this principle: when the defendants 




Typicality in the Pennsylvania rules mirrors the Federal rules.  In Pennsylvania 
courts, “some scintilla of evidence must be present for there to be a finding of typicality.”65 
                                                            
58 Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002); Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 227-28 (3d Cir. 
2001) (certifying class challenging city’s re-arrest policy). See also Piazza v. Ebsco Industries Inc., 273 F.3d 1341, 
1351 (11th Cir. 2001) (strong similarity of legal theories satisfies typicality despite substantial factual differences). 
59 Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2000).  
60 D.G. ex rel. Stricklin, 594 F.3d at 1199; Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 2004).  
61 See Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 480 (2d Cir. 2010). 
62 See, e.g., In re Franklin Mutual Funds Fee Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 2d 451, 461 (D.N.J. 2005).  
63 Id. 
64 Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2002); La Mar v. H & B Novelty and Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 
(9th Cir. 1973). 
65 Lewis v. Bayer AG, 2004 WL 1146692, *21 (C.P. Phila. Mar. 19, 2004). 
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Typicality is established when the class representative’s claims arise out of the same 
course of conduct, involve the same legal theories, and do not raise divergent goals or 
interests.  
 In Delaware County v. Mellon Financial Corp.,66 the Commonwealth Court 
reversed a class certification order because the class representative was subject to a 
“unique defense” that “could become the focus of the entire litigation and divert attention 
away from the suit as a whole, as well as disadvantage other class members.” Typicality 
was held not to be established in Eisen v. Independence Blue Cross,67 where chiropractic 
service providers sought class certification for allegedly improper policies and practices 
of health insurance companies. The Superior Court held that the differential treatment of 
patients - some being granted and some being denied benefits - made it unclear that the 
named representatives were consistently denied reimbursement.68  This analysis is 




Rule 23 (a)(4) requires that a class representative will represent fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of absent class members. Due process is the guiding 
principle when determining the adequacy of representation.69 By assuring adequacy of 
                                                            
66 914 A.2d 469, 476 (Pa. Commw. 2007). 









representation, Rule 23 permits class judgments to bind absent class members.70  The 
requirement of adequate representation applies to both the plaintiffs and counsel.  
During the inquiry into adequacy of representation, the court first asks whether the 
named plaintiffs will serve as adequate class representatives. By separating the inquiry 
into adequacy of representation from the second inquiry of commonality and typicality, 
the rule requires an assessment of issues on which the named representatives and any 
part of the class might disagree.  Class certification is improper when the interests of the 
representative party and the class conflict, although they do not need to be identical.71 In 
Anchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, a class was decertified after a finding that the claims of 
the named representatives were not aligned with those of the other class members.  In 
that case, class members were all exposed to asbestos, but many members suffered 
injuries completely different than those suffered by other class members, resulting in 
conflicts between the named plaintiffs and members of the class.72   
It is possible to avoid conflicts by counsel assessing all interests involved on a 
regular basis, informing the court of any potential conflicts when they arise, and asking 
the court to certify subclasses and appoint independent counsel to represent the varying 




71 Anchem Prod. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997). 
72 Id. See also Schlaud v. Snyder, 717 F.3d 451, 458 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding denial of certification of home 
childcare providers challenging union because proposed class included members who voted for union); Berger v. 
Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2001) (differences between named plaintiffs and class 







informing them of the right to intervene to oppose the named plaintiff’s position.74  In some 
instances, the court may define the class in a more limited way to avoid conflicts.75 
In addition to showing a lack of conflict with class members, the named plaintiff 
must also show a willingness to prosecute the class claims actively. In a case in which 
the named plaintiff failed to file for class certification for two and a half years, the court 
found that she failed to protect the interests of the proposed class.76  Adequate 
representation by the named plaintiff generally should not include an assessment of 
plaintiff’s financial resources, unless lack of financial resources is relevant to the named 
plaintiff’s willingness or ability to fund the litigation or represent the class.77 
When evaluating adequate representation of counsel, commitment and 
competency of counsel are important factors. The zeal and competency of class counsel 
are initially evaluated based on the experience of the lawyer or the legal organization for 
whom the lawyer works and the quality of initial pleadings.78   The court examines the 
conduct of counsel in the case to date and in other class actions to determine if the 
representation is adequate.79   Although an initial determination of counsel’s adequacy to 
                                                            
74 Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining options open to a district 
court). 
75 See, e.g., In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 304 ((3d Cir. 2010) (remanded the case to the lower court to 
decide whether, in view of the intra-class conflict, a subclass should be created). 
76 Rattray v. Woodbury County, 614 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2010); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 
385 (4th Cir. 2009) (apparent disinterest in case); cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010); Harriston v. Chicago Tribune 
Co., 992 F.2d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 1993). 
77 Horton, 690 F.2d at 485 n.26. 
78 Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1997) (inquiry into whether named plaintiffs will represent potential 
class with necessary vigor most often described as turning on questions of “whether plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified, 
experienced, and generally able to conduct proposed litigation”). See also Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 
F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2001) (adequacy requirement mandates inquiry into zeal and competence of representatives’ 
counsel).  
79 See, e.g., Kandel v. Bro. Int'l Corp., 264 F.R.D. 630, 634-35 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Armstrong v. Chi. Park Dist., 117 
F.R.D. 623, 631-34 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding inexperience alone may not be sufficient, but examining mistakes in other 
class actions as well as the one before in denying certification based on mistakes and inexperience). See also 
Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 2011) (vacating order 
certifying class, holding class counsel was  not adequate due to “lack of integrity” of counsel and court’s lack of 
conviction that they would represent interests of class); Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 
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represent the class is necessary to certify the class, the court has flexibility to decertify 




Adequacy of representation in Pennsylvania class actions mirrors the Federal 
rules.  The court considers whether the attorney for the representative parties will 
adequately represent the interests of the class, whether the representative parties have 
a conflict of interest in the maintenance of the class action, and whether the representative 
parties have or can acquire adequate financial resources to assure that the interests of 
the class will not be harmed.81  A lack of funding by the representative plaintiff, without 
more, is not sufficient to warrant denial of class certification. If an attorney for a class 
representative ethically advances costs and expenses to the representative, the adequate 
financing requirement of the certification test is met.82  If counsel has agreed and is able 
to advance costs, a representative’s own limited financial resources are not determinative 
of her adequacy.83  Adequacy may be lacking if the representative lacks the necessary 
financial resources and produces no evidence of an agreement in place to assist in 
financing the suit.84  
                                                            
2011) (finding lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding proposed class counsel inadequate based on lack of 
diligence and promptness, faulty discovery efforts, and lack of respect for judicial resources). 
80 E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., 431 U.S. at 405. 
81 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1709. 
82 Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., 740 A.2d 1152, 1171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 565 Pa. 612, 777 A.2d 442 (2001). 
83 Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 451 A.2d 451 (Pa. Super Ct. 1982); Foultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange. 
2002 WL 452115, *14 (C.P. Phila. March 13, 2002). 
84 See Keppley v. School District of Twin Valley, 866 A,2d 1165 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
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 Adequacy of representation is not determined solely based on financial adequacy.  
The adequacy of representation prerequisite was not met when plaintiff’s counsel failed 
to promptly move for class certification within thirty days after the last pleading was due 
or seek an extension, and counsel admitted he would need additional assistance but did 




Particular to class actions under Rule 23(b)(3), there is a requirement of common 
issues of law or fact to predominate (predominance requirement) that requires the 
proposed class to be superior to other available methods to resolve the dispute 
(superiority requirement).  Rule 23(b)(3) states “questions of law or fact common to class 
members [must] predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and 
that a class action [must be] superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.” The “and” in subsection (b)(3) means both the 





The Pennsylvania counterpart to Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement of predominance and 
superiority is found in Pennsylvania Rule 1708. That rule incorporates the predominance 
                                                            
85 Buynak v. Department of Transportation, 833 A.2d 1159, 1166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). 
21 
 
requirement, but not that of superiority. The Pennsylvania Rules do not require that the 
class action method be “superior” to alternative modes of suit.86  
 Pennsylvania Rule 1708 sets forth separate criteria to be considered by a court 
depending on whether monetary recovery or equitable or declaratory relief is sought.  This 
requirement is all encompassing, unlike Rule 23(b) which separates causes of action by 
type.  Where monetary recovery alone is sought, the court is to consider seven separate 
criteria. The first five of these, Pennsylvania Rule 1708(a)(1-5), includes Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement as well as other requirements identical to those found in Rule 
23(b)(1) and (3). However, the sixth and seventh criteria are not found in Rule 23: 
(6) whether in view of the complexities of the issues or the expenses of 
litigation the separate claims of individual class members are insufficient in 
amount to support separate actions; and, 
 
(7) whether it is likely that the amount which may be recovered by individual 
class members will be so small in relation to the expense and effort of 
administering the action as not to justify a class action. 
 
The seventh criterion was an issue in Kelly v. County of Allegheny87,  where the 
court held that a class action on behalf of over 10,000 public employees was not de 
minimus so as to warrant denial of certification on the ground that the recovery of each 
member, $13.61, was trivial in relation to the expense and effort of maintaining a class 
action.88 
 Where equitable or declaratory relief alone is sought, Pennsylvania Rule 1708(b) 
requires a court to consider the criteria set forth in Pennsylvania Rule 1708(a)(1-5) plus 
the criterion, identical to Rule 23(b)(2), whether the party opposing the class has acted or 
                                                            
86 Weinberg v. Sun Company, Inc., 740 A.2d 1152, 1163 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 777 A.2d 442 
(Pa. 2001). 




refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final equitable 
or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class.89 Where both monetary and 
other relief is sought, courts are required to consider all criteria in both subdivisions (a) 
and (b).90  The rule does not give any specific weight to the listed criteria nor insist on the 
exclusivity of the list, so there is an implied discretion for the trial court.91  
Pennsylvania Rule 1708 requires that a class action must constitute a fair and 
efficient method of resolving the issues in dispute, but stops short of the federal 
requirement of superiority.92 A trial court’s decision that recovery was likely to be so small 
in relation to the expense and effort of administering the action as not to justify class 
certification was reversed in Dunn v. Allegheny County Property Assessment Appeals 
and Review.93 The Commonwealth Court pointed out that public policy considerations 
and the stated purpose of the class action procedure is to permit the aggregation of small 
claims that would otherwise not be litigated in individual actions.94  On the other hand, 
when class members would have substantial claims in individual cases which would be 
economically feasible to pursue, class certification is not appropriate.95 Hence, 
Pennsylvania state courts acknowledge that part of the fair and efficient analysis includes 
whether plaintiffs will be able to economically bring their individual claims or not. 
                                                            





93 794 A.2d 416, 427 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). 
94 See also Baldassari v. Suburban Cable TV Co. Inc., 808 A.2d 184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (small recovery of $2.00 
per class member, with aggregate potential claim of $1.2 million, warranted certification); Kelly v. County of 
Allegheny, 546 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1988) (trial court abused discretion in denying class certification on ground that 
average recovery would be $13.61 for each class member). 
95 Savage Hyundai, Inc. v. North American Warranty Services, Inc., 60 Pa. D. & C. 4th 156 (C.P. Phila. 2002). But see 
Clemente v. Republic First Bank, 2005 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 181 at *14 (Phila. C.P. March 18, 2005) 
(certification proper even though named plaintiffs’ damages were approximately $25,000). 
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 Rule 1708(a)(1) requires a court to determine whether common questions 
predominate over any question affecting only individual members. This requirement was 
not met in Keppley v. School District of Twin Valley,96 when the court held predominance 
lacking where each class member would be required to testify concerning their individual 
expectations of privacy.97  
Pennsylvania Rule 1708(a)(2)98 includes manageability as a consideration when 
determining whether the class action will be fair and efficient.  The consideration of 
potential difficulties in managing a class action is relatively less important in the 
certification decision of the court compared to other factors and can often be overcome 
by creative case management within the court’s discretion. For example, in Wurtzel v. 
Park Towne Place Associates Limited Partnership, the ability to divide a class into 
subclasses under Rule 7710(c) eliminated any manageability issues presented where 
some class members would be confronted by defenses while others would not, since the 
defenses arose from common documents.99  
 Parsky v. First Union Corporation100 is another manageability decision. In Parsky, 
a national class of investors brought claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary 
                                                            
96 866 A.2d 1165 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
97 See also Kern v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc., 108 A.3d 1281, 1290 (Pa. Super Ct. 2015) (holding that, with respect 
to Section 201-9.2 of the UTPCPL, trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining “that, under Rule 1702(5), 
class action would not be a fair and efficient method of adjudication because individual reliance would be the 
predominant factor over the common issues.”); Eisen v. Independence Blue Cross, 839 A.2d 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003) (range of insurer reactions to benefit claims created variety of facts and legal claims which could not be 
covered by one single proceeding); Green v. Saturn Corp., 2001 WL 1807390, *5-7 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 24, 2001) 
(false advertising and misrepresentation claims would require reviewing reasons of each class member for 
purchasing vehicle). 
98 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1708(a)(2) (the size of the class and the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of 
the action as a class action;). 
99 Wurtzel v. Park Towne Place Associates Limited Partnership, 2002 WL 31487894 (C.P. Phila. Nov. 5, 2002). See 
also, Tesauro v. The Quigley Corporation, 2002 WL 372947 (C.P. Phila. Jan. 25, 2002) (potential choice of law 
issues for national class do not support denying class certification; application of other states’ consumer protection 
laws has no relevancy at certification stage of case) (citing Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 451 A.2d 451 
(Pa. Super Ct. 1982)). 
100 51 Pa. D. & C. 4th 468 (C.P. Phila 2001)). 
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duty arising from alleged tax liabilities as a result of the conversion of common trust funds. 
In certifying the proposed class, the court held, among other things, that no manageability 
problems were posed by applying both New Jersey and Pennsylvania law; that there was 
a high risk of inconsistent decisions; and, that a recovery of less than $50,000 for most 
class members was low enough to preclude separate actions for each member.101  
 In Washington v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., no manageability 
problems were perceived by the Superior Court when many individuals had opted out and 
sought to bring their own individual actions. The court held that coordination of the 
individual cases with the class action for discovery and other efficiency-related purposes 





The class may be defined or redefined at any time before final judgment.103 This 
may occur either following a motion of either party or by the court.104 Thus, counsel may 
reevaluate the initially drafted definition as discovery proceeds and the case takes shape. 
                                                            
101 See also, In re Pennsylvania Baycol Third-Party Payor Litigation, 2005 WL 852135, *9 (C.P. Phila April 4, 2005) 
(court will rely on ingenuity and aid of counsel, and upon its plenary authority, to control action to solve whatever 
management problems the litigation may bring); Lewis v. Bayer AG, 2004 WL 1146692, *22 (C.P. Phila Mar. 19, 
2004), where the court held that problems of administration alone should not justify denial of an otherwise appropriate 
class action (“given the prospect of a limited damage award and the expense of proving a medical monitoring claim,” 
court held that a class action was the “only means asymptomatic plaintiffs ha[d] to recover medical monitoring 
expenses.”). 







Membership in all three types of class action will either be included in a mandatory fashion 
or will have an opt-out ability.105 
The inclusion of class members in a putative class whose individual claims may 
be subject to affirmative defenses, such as a statute of limitations, does not preclude 
class certification so long as common issues otherwise predominate.106  If the injury is 
continuous, retroactive or prospective relief may be available.  The class definition may 





Pennsylvania Rule 1711(a) provides that every member of the class as defined in 
the court’s order is included in the class unless exclusion is requested by a specified date. 
This differs from the federal procedure which limits opting out to Rule 23(b)(3) actions. 
The Explanatory Note to the Pennsylvania rule points out that there will be times when 
self-exclusion should not be permitted, such as where the members of the class have 
joint, as distinguished from several, interests in the subject matter and their joinder is 
compulsory. In subsection (b), the rule provides the court with the option to require a true 
opt-in procedure only in certain limited instances, such as where the individual claims are 














Class actions in federal court are commenced with a Class Action complaint.  
The complaint will describe the events that caused the injury or financial harm suffered 
by the client.  The complaint will also state that the lawsuit seeks to recover 
compensation for the person filing the suit (sometimes known as the "lead plaintiff") and 
for all other individuals who suffered the same type of harm.  
	
2.	Class	Actions	in	Pennsylvania	State	Court	
In Pennsylvania state courts, a class action is begun by filing a complaint.108 When 
this complaint is filed, a judge must be assigned to the case who will oversee all aspects 
of that class action.109  Pennsylvania Rules 1703 provides that a class action shall be 
commenced “only” by the filing of a complaint with the Prothonotary in the form provided 
by Pennsylvania Rule 1704.  So, unlike in federal court, a case commenced as an 
individual case in state court cannot be amended to become a class action.110  
Pennsylvania Rule 1701 defines a “class action” as an action brought by or against parties 
as representatives of a class until the court by order refuses to certify it as such or revokes 
                                                            
108 Pa. R.C.P. 1703(a); Edward M. v. O’Neill, 436 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). 
109 Pa. R.C.P. 1703(b). 
110 Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (trial court abused discretion when it permitted 
plaintiff to amend individual case with class action allegations and new parties). 
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a prior certification.111  This principle is treated similarly in federal court for purposes of 
settlement.112  
The complaint must include a caption designating the action as a “Class Action.”113 
Under a separate heading entitled “Class Action Allegations,” declarations of fact that 
support the prerequisites above must be averred.114 Courts have required that all the facts 
which support the plaintiff’s class action be pleaded under this separate heading.115 Like 
Federal court, state court claims for equitable, declaratory, and monetary relief that arose 
out of the same action may be joined in the complaint.116 
Issues of fact involving the class action allegations are raised in the answer instead 









111 Pa.R.C.P. 1701(a). See Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Company, 348 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1975) (“class is in the 
action until properly excluded”); Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 60 Pa. D&C. 4th 13 (C.P. Phila. 2003) (putative class 
members entitled to protections of Rules of Professional Conduct and defendant not permitted to conduct ex parte 
interviews with class members). 
112 See, e.g., Philips v. Allegheny County, 869 F.2d 234, 237 (3rd Cir. 1989) (“action filed as class action should be 
treated as if certification has been granted for the purposes of settlement until certification is denied”); Kahan v. 
Rosenstiel. 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970) (“suit brought as a class action should be treated as such for purposes 
of dismissal or compromise, until there is a full determination that the class action is not proper”); but see Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of settlements only where class has been certified). 
113 Pa. R.C.P. 1704(a). 
114 Pa. R.C.P. 1704(b). See also Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a). 
115 Smolsky v. Governor’s Office of Admin. 990 A.2d 173 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2010). 
116 Pa. R.C.P. 1704(c). Commonwealth Court permits class action to be utilized to obtain individual property tax rebates 
that had been denied by the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. Holds that the criteria to obtain class action status 





The notice requirements in class action suits are described in Rule 23(c)(2). Notice 
requirements for class actions brought under 23(b)(1) and (2) are flexible and do not 
require individual notice while individual notice is required in Rule 23(b)(3) suits. Notice 
of opt-out rights is required in Rule 23(b)(3) cases. The court has discretion under Rule 
23(d)(1)(B) to order notice at any time in any Rule 23 lawsuit for the protection of the class 
members or the fair conduct of the lawsuit. 
Rule 23(c)(2)(A) provides that in class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) or 
(b)(2), “the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.” Notice is not required either 
before or after certification, or, indeed, at all.118  Because there is no right to opt out of a 
Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class, the need for notice is diminished and should be "exercised 
with care."119  Unlike suits brought under Rule 23(b)(3), if notice is required, it need not 
be individual.120  This flexible approach acknowledges that the cost of notice may “prove 
crippling and the benefits may be relatively small.”121  
b.	Burden	to	show	class	certification	















Ordinarily, a court may not address questions of certification until the pleading 
stage is completed and attacks on the complaint or demurrers to the substance of the 
claim have already been ruled upon.123   
 In Baldassari v. Suburban Cable TV Co. Inc.,124 the Superior Court stated that, in 
a class certification hearing, the court’s authority is confined to a consideration of the 
class action allegations, not the merits of the controversy.  This is similar to federal 
procedure, where the legal merits of the controversy would be addressed prior to 
responsive pleadings in a Rule 12 motion.125 
When the court certifies a class action, it must state in its order that every member 
of the court-defined class is a member unless the member specifically requests to opt out 
by a specified date.126 This rule is not absolute because there will be circumstances in 
which a party may not remove himself. In certain limited circumstances where the court 
finds the individual claims will be extensive, the court may provide in its order that no 
person may be a member of the class unless he or she opts into the class.127 
a.	Notice	to	class	
Pennsylvania Rule 1712 requires notice in all class actions. The Pennsylvania rule 
provides that in certain circumstances, individual notice is not required. The Pennsylvania 
rule says general notice may suffice if it is reasonably calculated to inform members of 
                                                            
123 Sears v. Corbett, 49 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2012) (“a court cannot make a class action determination until the close of 
pleadings”); Niemic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 721 A.2d 807, 810 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“upon a motion for class action 
certification the court considers whether a claim may be brought by a class of plaintiffs, whereas at the earlier, 
preliminary stage, the court must decide whether there exists a valid claim to be brought at all, no matter who the 
plaintiff”). 
124 808 A.2d 184 (Pa. Super Ct. 2002)(citing the Explanatory Note to Pennsylvania Rule 1707). 
125 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. 
126 Pa. R.C.P. 1711(a), (b)(1), (2); Egenrieder v. Ohio Cas. Group, 529 A.2d 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)( Parties 
certified as parties to the action may appeal on behalf of those who were excluded from the certification). 
127 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1711(b). 
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the pendency of the action, such as through newspapers, television, radio, or certain 
interest groups.  Further, the Pennsylvania rule allocates to the plaintiff the expense of 
providing notice, though the defendant may be required to cooperate in order to minimize 
expense.128  The federal rules are silent as to cost allocation. 
To be effective and binding, the notice provided to a class must pass constitutional 
requirements. In Wilkes v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co.,129 insureds and trustees of 
an insurance trust brought an action against a life insurance company to recover for 
misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, and breach of contract. The insurance company 
claimed that the res judicata effect of an out-of-state class settlement in which plaintiffs 
were notified of their class membership barred the suit. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, in reversing a lower court determination that genuine factual issues as to the 
adequacy of the notice precluded summary judgment on the res judicata question, 
undertook a broad collateral review and found the notice constitutionally adequate.130  
While acknowledging that inadequate notice is an exception to both res judicata doctrine 
and the grant of full faith and credit to out-of-state judgments, the court held that the 
information provided in the notice adequately warned the plaintiffs that they were included 
in the earlier class action litigation.131  
 In Tesauro v. The Quigley Corp., the plaintiff’s proposal that notice be posted on 
the defendant’s website was denied because potential prejudice to the defendant 
                                                            
128 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1712.  





outweighed plaintiff’s desire to minimize expense of sending notice through the 
defendant’s established methods of communication as provided in Rule 1712(c).132  
b.	Burden	to	show	class	certification	
The burden of showing each of the elements of class certification is initially on the 
moving party.133 This burden “is not heavy and is thus consistent with the policy that 
decisions in favor of maintaining a class action should be liberally made.”134  The moving 
party must present evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case from which the 
court can conclude that the class certification requirements are met.135  Where evidence 
conflicts, doubt should be resolved in favor of class certification.136  “The prima facie 
burden of proof standard at the class certification stage is met by a qualitative ‘substantial 
evidence’ test.”137  “Courts have consistently interpreted the phrase ‘substantial evidence’ 
to mean ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but evidence ‘which a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.’”138  
 The courts in Pennsylvania have stressed that, in deciding a motion for class 
certification, the merits of the underlying case should not be considered; the hearing is 
confined to a consideration of the class action allegations and is not concerned with the 
merits of the controversy or with attacks on the other averments of the complaint.139 Its 
only purpose is to decide whether the action shall continue as a class action or as an 
action with individual parties only; it is designed to decide who shall be the parties to the 
                                                            
132 Tesauro v. The Quigley Corporation, 2002 WL 372947 (C.P. Phila. Jan. 25, 2002). 
133 Cambanis v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 501 A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
134 Id. at  637. 
135 Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137. 153-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
136 Lewis v. Bayer AG, 2004 WL 1146692, *7 (C.P. Phila. Mar. 19, 2004). 
137 Id. 
138 Crepeau v. Rite Aid, Inc., 2005 WL 1041395, *3 (C.P. Phila. May 3, 2005)(quoting SSEN, Inc. v. Borough of 
Eddystone, 810 A. 2d 200, 207 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)). 
139 Baldassari v. Suburban Cable TV Co., 808 A.2d 184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
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action and nothing more.140 The merits of the action and the right of the plaintiff to recover 
are to be excluded from consideration.141  However, “courts may need to examine the 





Rule 23(d) gives the court authority to issue orders that determine the course of 
proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication during the 
presentation of evidence and argument,143 require additional notices to class members 
during the proceedings,144 impose conditions on representative parties or intervenors,145 
require pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation of absent 
persons,146 or deal with similar procedural matters.147  
2.	Class	Actions	in	Pennsylvania	State	Court	
With one exception, Rule 1713 copies Federal Rule 23(d). It omits the Federal 
provision for an order amending the pleadings. This is unnecessary, since Rule 1033 
regulating amendment of the pleadings is already incorporated by reference by Rule 
1701(b). In addition to administrative and procedural matters, the court may require 
                                                            
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 189-90 (quoting Pa.R.C.P. 1707, Explanatory Comment). Accord, Cavanaugh v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel 
Corp., 528 A.2d 236 (Pa. Super Ct. 1987); Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C. 4th 359 (C.P. Phila. 2005) 
(credibility may not be the focus of a certification decision, and it would not be proper to deny certification even if 
court concluded that the plaintiffs had not proven their case to the satisfaction of the court sitting as if conducting a 
non-jury trial). 








additional notices to some or all of the members of (1) steps in the action, or (2) the 
proposed extent of the judgment, or (3) an opportunity to signify whether they consider 
the representation fair and adequate.148 The court may also permit intervention. As to 
these interlocutory notices the rule specifically provides, as does Federal Rule 23(d), that 





Rule 23(e) requires that parties obtain court approval for voluntary dismissal or 
compromise and that proposals to settle the case be sent to the entire class for approval.   
Because class actions are vulnerable to conflicts of interest for the attorneys representing 
the class or the class representatives (i.e. their interests versus the interest of the class), 
the rule imposes obligations on the court and the parties seeking to settle the case.  The 
rule requires court approval of resolutions only when the class has been certified.150 
Attorney’s fees are allowed under Rule 23.151  However the actual mechanism for 
awarding of fees is not addressed in the Rules.  Instead, the amount of attorney’s fees 








152 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (limiting fee awards in coupon settlements). 
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Pennsylvania Rule 1714 provides in subsection (a) that no class action shall be 
compromised, settled, or discontinued without the approval of the court after hearing. It 
provides that prior to certification the representative party may discontinue the action with 
court approval without notice to the members of the class if the court finds that the 
discontinuance will not prejudice the members of the class.  
Pennsylvania law requires that a class action may not be settled without a hearing 
and court approval.153  Class action settlements are not required to benefit all class 
members equally.154  The applicable standard for approving a class action settlement is 
the analysis established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Dauphin Deposit Bank 
and Trust Co. v. Hess.155 Seven factors are considered to determine whether a class 
action settlement should be approved: 
(1)  the risks of establishing liability and damages; 
(2)  the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible 
recovery; 
(3)  the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks 
of litigation; 
(4)  the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; 
(5)  the state of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; 
(6)  the recommendations of competent counsel; and 
(7)  the reaction of the class to the settlement.156 
                                                            
153 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1714(a). 
154 Gregg v. Independence Blue Cross, 2004 WL 869063, *47 (Pa. Com. Pl. Apr. 22, 2004). 




Pennsylvania Rule 1714(b) allows that a class action may be discontinued without 
notice, prior to certification, if the court finds that the discontinuance will not prejudice the 
members of the class. Such discontinuance must be preceded by a hearing and factual 
findings that discontinuance prior to certification would not prejudice members of the 
class.157  
 Pennsylvania Rule 1714(d) provides that courts may approve class action 
settlements that do not create residual funds.  Pennsylvania Rule 1716 addresses 
residual funds in class actions. Pennsylvania Rule 1716(a) provides that any order 
entering a judgment or approving the settlement or compromise of a class action must 
provide for the disbursement of residual funds. Pennsylvania Rule 1716(b) states that 
“not less than fifty percent (50%) of residual funds in a given class action shall be 
disbursed to the Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers Trust Account Board.” Further, the 
remaining funds may be disbursed “to the Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers Trust 
Account Board, or to another entity for purposes that have a direct or indirect relationship 
to the objectives of the underlying class action, or which otherwise promote the 
substantive or procedural interests of the members of the class.”158  
Pennsylvania Rule 1717 provides the criteria to be applied by the court in 
determining the amount of attorneys’ fees.  The non-exclusive list of factors in the 
Pennsylvania Rule includes the time and effort reasonably expended, the quality of the 
services, the results achieved and benefits conferred upon the class or the public, the 
magnitude, complexity, and uniqueness of the litigation, and whether the receipt of a fee 
was contingent on success.  
                                                            




   Pennsylvania Courts are “permitted to award a reasonable fee pursuant to a 
lodestar, a percentage of the common fund, or, if necessary, a hybrid approach.”159  A 
court may apply a “contingency enhancement, i.e., a multiplier,” to the lodestar calculation 
but “only if the lodestar does not reflect counsel’s contingent risk.”160  
 A settlement in a class action lawsuit is entitled to the initial presumption that it is 
fair.161  The factors required to establish this presumption are: 
(1)  That the settlement has been arrived at by arm’s-length bargaining; 
(2)  That sufficient discovery has been taken or investigation completed to enable 
counsel and the court to act intelligently; 
(3)  That the proponents of the settlement are counsel experienced in similar 
litigation; and 
(4)  That the number of objectors or interests they represent is not large when 
compared to the class as a whole.162 
In the absence of a binding Pennsylvania rule or case law, the Milkman court adopted the 
procedure used for proposed settlement in federal class action suits.163  
 An order disapproving a class settlement is immediately appealable under the 
“collateral order” doctrine.164  However, an order granting preliminary approval of a class 
                                                            
159 Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 979 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 106 A.3d 656 (Pa. 
2015), petitions for cert. docketed, (U.S. Mar. 17, 2015) (Nos. 14-1123, 14-1124). 
160 Id. (reversing trial court’s award of 3.7 multiplier on lodestar amount based on finding that hourly rates of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys reflected contingency risk and remanding for re-calculation of fees). 
161 Gregg v. Independence Blue Cross, 2004 WL 869063, *31 (C.P. Phila. Apr. 22, 2004). 
162 Milkman v. American Travelers Life Insurance Co., 2002 WL 778272, *5 (C.P. Phila. Apr. 1, 2002) (citing Herbert 
B. Newberg and Alba Conte, 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 11.41 (3d ed. 1992)). 
163 Milkman v. American Travelers Life Insurance Company, 2001 WL 1807376 (C.P. Phila. Nov. 26, 2001) (adopting 
two-step process for approval of class action settlements set forth in Manual for Complex Litigation, Third, § 30.41 at 
237). 
164 See, e.g., Treasurer of State of Conn. V. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll LLP, 866 A.2d 479, 483-84 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2005); Buchanan v. Century Fed. Sav’s & Loan Ass’n, 393 A.2d 704 (Pa. Super Ct. 1978). 
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settlement but imposing certain conditions in order to obtain final approval is not 





 Although class actions in Pennsylvania state courts and federal court are quite 
similar, there are some specific differences that can impact selection.  Generally 
speaking, it is easier to initiate a class action in Pennsylvania state court, but it is also 
more difficult to conclude the action.  If an attorney anticipates the case going to final 
verdict, procedural issues such as rules of evidence may dominate the determination of 
where to file the case.  However, it is easier to conclude negotiated settlements of cases 
at the pre-certification stage in federal court.  Only the Pennsylvania rules require court 
approval of pre-certification settlements.  The certification scheme of Pennsylvania rules 
1702 (prerequisites) and 1708 (determination of fair and efficient method of adjudication) 
creates a framework that can include more class actions than the federal rules.    Add to 
this the ability in federal court for ability to get claims dismissed through Rule 12 motions.  
Bringing class actions in federal court is decidedly more difficult. 
 
                                                            
165 Brophy v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 921 A.2d 80 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). 
